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TELECOMMUNICATIONS__
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ISSUE
May a pay phone provider sue in
federal district court to enforce FCC
regulations requiring payment of
certain fees by other carriers to pay
phone providers?

FACTS
Respondent Metrophones
Telecommunications, Inc., is the
owner of pay phones (known in
telecommunications jargon and in
the briefs as a Pay Phone Service
Provider or PSP). Petitioner Global
Crossing Telecommunications, Inc.,
is a long-distance telecommunications company (an Interexchange
Carrier or IXC). Metrophones sued
Global Crossing (and several other
carriers no longer in the case) in
federal district court, alleging that
Global Crossing had failed to pay
Metrophones monies that were due
under FCC regulations governing socalled coinless pay phone calls.

Coinless pay phone calls are calls
made using access codes or 800
numbers to access carriers (including long-distance carriers) other
than the default carrier associated
with the pay phone.
Metrophones alleged that its lawsuit
arose under the Communications
Act, which gives persons injured by
a common carrier's violation of the
Act the right to sue for damages in
federal district court. 47 U.S.C. §§
206-207. In the district court,
Metrophones alleged that there were
two different violations of the Act
that supported its right to sue. At
first, Metrophones argued that a
provision of the act that requires
the FCC to promulgate regulations
ensuring that pay phone companies
receive compensation for every
coinless call (47 U.S.C. § 276) also
gave rise to a cause of action to
recover sums that should have been
paid under the regulations. A decision of the Ninth Circuit, Greene v.
(Continued on Page 32)
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Sprint Communications Co., 34(0
F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 2003), which
was issued while the suit brought by
Metrophones was in the district
court, held that this statutory provision in section 276 did not itself
create a right to sue. Metrophones
then amended its complaint to
allege that the defendants' failure to
pay monies due under the FCC regulations amounted to an unjust and
unreasonable practice and thus violated the Communications Act's
core requirement that all carrier
charges, practices, classifications, or
regulations "in connection with"
communication service shall be
"just and reasonable." 47 U.S.C. §
201(b).
The Ninth Circuit agreed with
Metrophones on the question now
before the Supreme Court: specifically, that the suit had been properly brought in federal court. The
Ninth Circuit's decision in the case
now before the Court was made on
an interlocutory appeal (by permission of both the district court and
the Ninth Circuit itself), and so it
does not address the ultimate question of whether Global Crossing in
fact owes the monies that
Metrophones seeks to recover.
CASE ANALYSIS
The Communications Act of 1934,
in its basic provisions, is a classic
regulated-industries statute, envisioning federal supervision of most
of a communications carrier's operations. The act requires interstate
common carriers to file with the
Federal Communications
Commission tariffs that show all of
the carrier's charges for and practices relating to its services. 47
U.S.C. § 203. The carriers' "charges,
practices, classifications, [and] regulations" must be "just and reasonable" (47 U.S.C. § 201(b)) and cannot be discriminatory (§ 202(a)).
The Federal Communications
Commission is empowered to

review tariffs (§ 203). The FCC is
also empowered to "prescribe such
rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry
out the provisions of"' the act. §
201(b). The Court has recently reiterated the breadth of this grant to
the commission in AT&T Corp. v.
Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366
(1999), when the Court held that
the commission's rule-making
authority under section 201(b)
extended to implementing all provisions in Title II of the act, even
those added after section 201(b).
A recurring problem in modern
telecommunications law is the interaction between this traditional,
regulated-industries statute and
developing competition in communications markets. This case occupies a corner of that more general
conflict, but one that Congress itself
has visited. In particular, on two
occasions, Congress has amended
the act to address competitive practices with respect to pay phone services. The 1980s saw the growth of
independent pay phone providersthat is, pay phone providers that
were not themselves the local
exchange carrier in an area. With
the advent of competition in longdistance markets following the
break up of the Bell System (in
1984), many independent pay
phone providers entered into relationships with long-distance or
other carriers. In some cases, these
pay phone providers blocked access
codes to other, unaffiliated carriers,
because if customers "dialed
around" the pay phone provider's
own service, the pay phone provider
would not receive any compensation for the call. This led to
Congress's first intervention, the
Telephone Operator Consumer
Services Improvement Act of 1990
or "TOCSIA" (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 226), which forbade the blocking
of such access codes and numbers.
The statute correlatively directed

the FCC to consider adopting rules
requiring the compensation of pay
phone providers for such coinless,
dial-around calls, whereupon the
FCC adopted a flat per-pay phone
compensation scheme. Pay phone
providers were unhappy with this
scheme.
In the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Congress again acted. This
time, it both directed that subsidies
to pay phone services should end
and required the FCC to adopt rules
that ensured that -all pay phone
service providers are fairly compensated for each and every completed
intrastate and interstate call using
their pay phone." 47 U.S.C. § 276.
The FCC then adopted rules that
essentially require the carrier that
provides the calling card or prepaid
card service to compensate the pay
phone provider for each coinless,
dial-around call placed from a pay
phone. (This may or may not be the
company that actually sold the card
to the consumer, but this complication is not important to the issues
in this case.) Under the FCC rules,
the price has changed over time: it
started at 35 cents/call; the briefs
agree that at the time relevant here,
the price was 24 cents/call. The
FCC regulations allow carriers to
negotiate with pay phone service
providers for different rates, but in
the absence of an agreement, the
FCC rules set the price.
The FCC has addressed the manner
in which pay phone service
providers should recover from
carriers that did not pay, as some
did not. In a proceeding that concluded in 2(03, the FCC stated
that a carrier's failure to pay the
mandated sums to pay phone
providers "constitutes both a violation of section 276 and an unjust
and unreasonable practice in violation of section 201(b) of the
[Communications] Act." The FCC
further opined that, as a result, pay

Issue No. 1

phone providers could sue in federal
district court to enforce their right
to receive payment under the
regulations.
The broadest argument of Global
Crossing, the defendant, is that the
Communications Act provides a
right to sue in district court (a socalled "private right of action") only
for violations of the act itself, and
not for violations of the FCC's regulations, even where those regulations are enacted pursuant to the
act. The argument flows from the
text of section 206 of the Act, which
provides for damages for violations
of "this chapter." Global Crossing
notes that one other provision of
the Communications Act, as well as
provisions of other statutes,
expressly creates causes of actions
for violations of the statute and violations of the implementing regulations. Thus, the argument proceeds
that Congress knows how to create
a cause of action for violations of
regulations, and did not do so in
this case.
Global Crossing maintains that even
if it has violated the FCC's regulations (which of course it does not
expressly concede), it has not violated any provision of the
Communications Act itself. As to
section 201(b), Global Crossing
argues that payments to pay phone
providers are not "practices" relating to interstate telecommunications services. Global Crossing notes
that section 201(b) does not mention pay phone services; it also
argues that its failure to pay is not
unjust or unreasonable. As to section 276, Global Crossing argues
that the statute alone does not
require carriers to pay any charges
to pay phone providers; payment
could come from the customers
themselves or other sources.
Global Crossing contends that the
FCC's statement that a carrier's fail-

ure to pay constitutes a violation of
the act is irrelevant, despite the
usual rule that an agency's interpretation of the statute is entitled to
substantial deference from the
courts. First, Global Crossing argues
that only the courts can determine
whether a cause of action exists.
Second, Global Crossing argues that
the FCC did not adequately explain
its reasoning. And, third, Global
Crossing argues that even if the
FCC is entitled to deference, its
interpretation of section 201(b) is
wrong, and that failure to comply
with the regulations cannot be an
unjust and unreasonable practice
relating to communications services
within the meaning of the Act.
In large part, Global Crossing
frames these arguments by stating
that the issue is whether the Court
will "imply" a cause of action, under
section 201(b), for violation of the
commission's rules even though the
statute appears to limit lawsuits to
those based on violations of the
statute. This framing allows Global
Crossing to locate its arguments
within the broader debate over
"implied rights of action." In earlier
decades, the Supreme Court was
willing to give private parties the
right to sue to enforce provisions of
federal statute, even if those
statutes did not themselves mention
lawsuits by private parties. For
example, the Supreme Court recognized rights to sue to enforce the
anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws and the anti-discrimination
provisions of Title IX, even though
the statutes did not mention private
litigation. In the past 20 years, by
contrast, the Supreme Court has
been entirely unwilling to imply
such private rights of action when
the statute is silent and has largely
resisted any attempt to expand the
previously implied private rights of
action (although it has not reversed
the specific types of lawsuits it previously sanctioned).

The argument for Metrophones
begins by attacking Global
Crossing's framing of the issue, by
emphasizing that the
Communications Act does create a
private right of action for violations
of the statute. Congress created an
express cause of action, the argument observes; there is no need to
imply one. Metrophones notes that
the FCC specifically stated that the
failure to pay compensation that is
due under the rules is itself a violation of two sections of the statute,
section 276's requirement of compensation to pay phone providers
and section 201(b)'s prohibition on
unjust and unreasonable practices.
Metrophones argues that the FCC is
simply interpreting the terms of the
substantive provisions of the statute
and not encroaching on any traditional power of the courts to determine their own jurisdiction. And,
the argument goes, once the FCC
says that violation of its regulation
is a violation of the statute, then
Congress's determination that private parties may sue for violations
of the statute is dispositive.
On the merits of the FCC's interpretation, Metrophones notes that carriers including Global Crossing had
an opportunity previously to challenge the FCC's pay phone rules and
to challenge the FCC's statement
that violations of the regulation constituted a violation of the statute
through the typical route of a direct
challenge to the regulations. Indeed,
the FCC's pay phone rules themselves have been subjected to judicial review (and survived in relevant
part). Metrophones of course argues
that the FCC's interpretation was
substantively correct: that it is an
unjust and unreasonable practice to
refuse to pay money owed under the
commission's rules (the section
201(b) argument), and that it is a
violation of the requirement that
pay phone providers be compen(Continued on Page 34)
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sated for every coinless call (the
section 276 argument).
The United States, in an amicus
brief signed by the Solicitor General
and the FCC, supports
Metrophones. The government
largely repeats the arguments made
by Metrophones although it does
not focus on section 276 to the
same extent. The United States'
brief also argues that, if the Court
adopts Global Crossing's argument,
the enforcement scheme of the
Communications Act will be radically changed. The government notes
that sections 206-208 of the
Communications Act not only govern private rights of action in federal district court but also complaints
to the FCC. If these sections were
interpreted in a way that foreclosed
a private lawsuit in federal court,
private parties would also lose the
right to bring an administrative
complaint before the FCC. In the
main, then, FCC regulations could
only be enforced by penalty or forfeiture proceedings initiated by the
agency itself, which, the United
States says, "could have effects in
regulatory areas far beyond pay
phone compensation disputes and
has the potential to restrict dramatically private enforcement of the
Communications Act."
SIGNIFICANCE
As noted, the Ninth Circuit in this
case upheld the right of a pay phone
provider to sue in federal district
court to enforce its right to payment
under the FCC regulations while the
D.C. Circuit reached the opposite
conclusion. See APCC Servs., Inc.
v. Sprint Communs. Co., 418 F.3d
1238 (D.C. Cir. 2005), petition for
cert. pending, No. 05-766 (filed Dec.
12, 2005). The Court could restrict
itself to this narrowly phrased
question, or it could more broadly
tackle the issue of private enforcement of FCC (or even other agency)
regulations.

If the Court were to adopt Global
Crossing's broadest argument, this
could lead to a significant decrease
in private enforcement of the
Communications Act, whether by
federal lawsuits or through administrative complaints. The FCC's rules
would then, in all likelihood, be
enforceable only by the FCC, which
would mean either a significant
increase in FCC enforcement activities or unremedied violations. And
much FCC enforcement would
result in penalties payable not to
the injured party, but to the U.S.
Treasury. As competition is developing in telecommunications markets,
the FCC is actually seeking to move
in the other direction, toward less
rule making and administrative
enforcement and toward more private party--driven resolution of
conflicts under the act (as has been
typical in most industries, but not
,regulated industries" such as common carriers and public utilities).
(There is the potential that the FCC
could claim the statutory power to
craft its own private, administrative
enforcement regime, but this claim
would be subject to the vigorous
challenge that Congress delimited
the available remedies, thus foreclosing the FCC's ability to use its
"inherent" Communications Act
authority to create a new remedy.)
Moreover, very broad language from
the Court to the effect that an
agency's regulations are not encompassed within a private right of
action for statutory violations could
have implications going beyond the
Communications Act to other regulatory regimes.
It is possible that the Court could go
in entirely the opposite direction,
holding that all violations of FCC
regulations are the same as violations of the Act-as the FCC's
authority to act flows from the
statute and under standard administrative law doctrine, an FCC rule
that is consistent with the statute

has the same force of law as the
statute itself. This broadest view of
the FCC's authority is not pressed
on the Court by either Metrophones
or the United States, which both
argue that the cause of action is triggered by the FCC's specific finding
that violation of this regulation is an
unjust and unreasonable practice.
But if the crux of the "unreasonableness" is the violation of the regulation (and not the simple failure to
pay the pay phone provider adequate compensation), then it should
follow that violations of other regulations are also unjust and unreasonable practices-whether or not the
FCC has made a specific finding.
And, again, broad language by the
Court here might spill over to other
statutes and regulations.
The Court could resolve the case on
fairly narrow grounds, avoiding the
global issue of private rights to sue
on FCC (or other agency) regulations by focusing on section 276,
the provision through which
Congress required the FCC to set
compensation rules for pay phone
providers. The Court could read
that statute as determining the
issue, in either direction, thus making this case solely about resolving
the circuit split between the D.C.
and Ninth Circuit over pay phone
providers' right to sue carriers that
do not pay monies (allegedly) owed
under the FCC's rules.
Administrative law aficionados may
notice a lurking issue in this case,
which is somewhat similar to one
also pending in Watters v. I.7ichovia
Bank, No. 05-1342. In Watters, the
question is what level of deference
(if any) to accord to an agency's
statement that its regulations preempt state law, where that statement is made in the explanatory
section of an agency's decision as
opposed to the regulations that the
agency actually adopts. In this case,
the FCC's statement that violations

Issue No. 1

of its pay phone compensation regulations also constituted a violation
of the statute similarly was not codified in regulations. It is unlikely,
however, that the Court would grapple with the issue in this case, in
which none of the briefs address it.
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